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Abstract
Using a broadcast channel to transmit clients’ data requests may impose privacy risks. In this paper,
we address such privacy concerns in the index coding framework. We show how a malicious client can
infer some information about the requests and side information of other clients by learning the encoding
matrix used by the server. We propose an information-theoretic metric to measure the level of privacy
and show how encoding matrices can be designed to achieve specific privacy guarantees. We then
consider a special scenario for which we design a transmission scheme and derive the achieved levels
of privacy in closed-form. We also derive upper bounds and we compare them to the levels of privacy
achieved by our scheme, highlighting that an inherent trade-off exists between protecting privacy of the
request and of the side information of the clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a set of clients who share the same broadcast domain and wish to download data
content from a server. Even though the content that they request may be publicly available, they
wish to preserve the anonymity of their requests. For instance, assume that a client requests a
video from YouTube related to a particular medical condition. If other clients learn about the
identity of that request, this may then violate the privacy of that client. In this paper, we are
interested in studying how to maintain the privacy of clients sharing a broadcast domain.
It is well established that coding across the content messages of the clients is needed to
efficiently use the shared broadcast domain, as formalized in index coding [1]. A typical index
coding instance consists of a server with m messages, connected through a broadcast channel
to a set of n clients. Each client possesses a subset of the messages as side information and
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2requires a specific new message. The server then uses these side information sets to send coded
transmissions, which efficiently deliver the required messages to the clients.
In this paper we claim that index coding poses a privacy challenge. Consider, for example,
that a server transmits b1 + b2 to satisfy client 1. Since this is a broadcast transmission, other
clients observing this transmission will infer that the request of client 1 is either b1 or b2, while
the other message must belong to her side information. This suggests that, although the clients
can securely convey their requests to the server (e.g., through pairwise keys), a curious client
may be able to infer information about the requests and/or side information sets of other clients
by learning the encoding matrix used to generate the broadcast transmissions.
The first question we ask is: how much information does the encoding matrix in index coding
reveal about the requests and the side information of other users? At a high level, one can think
of the request and side information as two shared secrets between each client and the server,
where one secret could be used to protect the other. Therefore, as we also show in the paper,
these two aspects exhibit a trade-off: maintaining a certain level of privacy on one aspect limits
the amount of privacy level achieved on the other. We also ask: can we design index coding
matrices that, for a given number of transmissions, achieve the highest possible level of privacy?
How should these matrices be designed and how much privacy can they guarantee?
In this paper, we take first steps in answering such questions. Our main contributions can be
summarized as follows:
1) We propose an information-theoretic metric to characterize the levels of privacy that can
be guaranteed. We then provide guidelines for designing encoding matrices and transmission
strategies to achieve high privacy levels;
2) We design an encoding matrix and characterize the maximum levels of privacy that it can
achieve;
3) We derive universal upper bounds (i.e., which hold independently of the scheme that is used)
on the maximum levels of privacy that can be attained;
4) We consider a special case of the problem and we characterize in closed-form the levels of
privacy achieved by our scheme, which then we compare to the outer bounds, hence highlighting
the privacy trade-off.
Related Work. In secure index coding [2], the primal goal is to design strategies such that a
passive external eavesdropper – who wiretaps the communication from the server to the clients
– cannot learn any information about the messages. Differently, in this work we seek to protect
3clients’ privacy against adversaries who wish to learn information about the identity of the
requests and side information sets of the clients.
Recently, there has been a lot of effort trying to address privacy concerns in communication
setups. For instance, a set of relevant work has considered the problem of protecting privacy of a
user against a database. This problem was introduced in [3] and is known as Private Information
Retrieval (PIR). Specifically, in PIR a client wishes to receive a specific message from a set of
(possibly colluding) databases, without revealing the identity of the request. Towards this end,
data request and/or storage schemes were designed [4], [5] and recently the PIR capacity was
characterized [6], [7].
In cryptography, the Oblivious Transfer (OT) problem [8] has a close connection to PIR [9].
Specifically, in OT the goal is to protect both the privacy of the client against the server (i.e.,
as in PIR, the identity of the request of the client is not revealed to the server) and the privacy
of the server against the client (i.e., the client learns only the requested message). OT has also
been used as a primitive to build techniques for secure multi-party computation [9].
Different from these works, in this paper we seek to understand the privacy issues that can arise
among clients who share the same broadcast domain. Specifically, we seek to design techniques
that guarantee high levels of privacy both in the side information and in the request of a client
against another curious client. Given the different problem formulation, the techniques developed
to solve the PIR and OT problems do not easily extend to our setup.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we define our setup. In
Section III we provide definitions and guidelines on how to design privacy-preserving transmis-
sion schemes and we derive fundamental upper bounds. In Section IV we present the design of a
privacy-preserving matrix. Based on this matrix, in Section V we consider a specific scenario for
which we propose a transmission scheme and assess its performance. In Section VI we conclude
the paper. Some of the proofs are delegated to the appendices.
Notation. Calligraphic letters indicate sets; boldface lower case letters denote vectors and bold-
face upper case letters indicate matrices; |X | is the cardinality of X ; [n] is the set of inte-
gers {1, · · · , n}; 2[n] and ([n]
s
)
are the power set and the set of all possible subsets of [n] of
size s, respectively; for all x ∈ R, the floor function is denoted with bxc; for a sequence
X = {X1, . . . , Xn}, XS is the subsequence of X where only the elements indexed by S are
retained; 0i×j is the all-zero matrix of dimension i×j; AS is the submatrix of A where only the
4columns indexed by S are retained; span(A) is the linear span of the columns of A; H(X|y)
is the entropy of the random variable X , conditioned on the specific realization y;
(
n
k
)
= 0 if
k < 0 or k > n; logarithms are in base 2.
II. SETUP
We consider a typical index coding instance, where a set of clients N = {c[n]}, with |N | = n,
are connected to a server through a shared broadcast channel. The server has a database of
messages M = {b[m]}, with |M| = m. Each client ci, i ∈ [n], is represented by a pair of
random variables, namely: (i) Q¯i ∈ [m] associated with the index of the message that ci wishes
to download from the server and (ii) S¯i ∈ 2[m], associated with the indices of the subset of
messages she already has as side information. We indicate with q¯i and S¯i the realizations of
Q¯i and S¯i, respectively, which are chosen uniformly at random from their respective domains.
Clearly, q¯i /∈ S¯i. We assume that the pairs (Q¯i, S¯i), ∀i ∈ [n], are independent across i ∈ [n].
Server Model. We assume that the server knows the request and the side information of each
client, i.e., it is aware of the realizations of the random variables Q¯i = q¯i and S¯i = S¯i, with
i ∈ [n]. Given this, the server seeks to satisfy the requests of the clients through T broadcast
transmissions. The server employs linear encoding, i.e., each transmission consists of a linear
combination of the m messages, where the coefficients are chosen from a finite field FL with L
being large enough. This can be mathematically formulated as Ab = y, where b ∈ FmL is the
column vector of the m messages, A ∈ FT×mL is the encoding matrix used by the server and
y ∈ FTL is the column vector with linear combinations of the messages.
Therefore, a transmission scheme employed by the server consists of the following two
components:
i) Transmission space: a specific set A of encoding matrices designed to satisfy the clients
and protect their privacy;
ii) Transmission strategy: a function that, given (q¯[n], S¯[n]), determines the encoding matrix
A ∈ A to be used. We model the output of the function as a random variable A where
A = Aˆ according to a probability distribution pA|Q¯[n],S¯[n](Aˆ|q¯[n], S¯[n]) that has to be designed.
Adversary Model. We assume that some of the clients – referred to as eavesdroppers –
are malicious. Specifically, the eavesdroppers are non-cooperative clients who, based on the
broadcast transmissions they receive, are eager to infer information about the requests and the
5side information sets of other clients. Since the eavesdroppers do not cooperate, without loss of
generality, we can assume that there is only one eavesdropper in the system, namely client cn.
In addition, we assume that the eavesdropper cn: (i) is aware of both the transmission scheme
employed by the server and the underlying distribution based on which the clients obtain their
requests and side information sets; (ii) has infinite computational power; (iii) knows the size of
the side information set of each client, i.e., si = |S¯i|, i ∈ [n]. This last assumption, which we
make to simplify the analysis, provides pessimistic privacy guarantees with respect to a scenario
where the eavesdropper does not have this information.
Based on this knowledge, the eavesdropper cn wishes to infer information about the request and
side information of the other clients. Specifically, we denote with Qi and Si the random variables,
which represent the eavesdropper’s estimate of the request and side information of client ci,
respectively and we let pQi(qi) and pSi(Si) be the corresponding probability density functions.
For ease of notation, in the rest of the paper, we drop the subscripts from the probability density
functions while retaining the arguments. Clearly, Qn = Q¯n and Sn = S¯n. Before transmission,
the eavesdropper is completely oblivious to Qi and Si for i ∈ [n − 1]; we model this situation
by having p(qi|si) and p(Si|si) uniformly distributed over [m] and
(
[m]
si
)
, respectively1. Then, by
learning the specific encoding matrix Aˆ employed by the server, the eavesdropper infers some
information about the other clients, which is reflected in the conditional probability distributions
p(qi|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) and p(Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn).
Privacy Metric. We consider the amount of knowledge the eavesdropper has about the variables
Qi and Si as a privacy metric. In particular, we evaluate how far the uniform distribution is from
the conditional distribution that the eavesdropper has after learning the encoding matrix Aˆ. Let
X ∈ {Q[n], S[n]}. Then, inspired by the t-closeness metric for data privacy [10], we consider
the Kullback–Leibler divergence as a distance metric between the distributions p(x|Aˆ, si, qn,Sn)
and p(x|si), namely
DKL(p(x|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn)||p(x|si)) = log(|X |)−H(X|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn), (1)
where X is the support of X (note that the entropy used throughout the paper is conditioned
on specific realizations). If DKL(p(x|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn)||p(x|si)) = 0, i.e., H(X|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) =
1In principle, in p(qi|si) and p(Si|si) we should also have qn, Sn and s[n]\{i} in the conditioning. However, since (Q¯i, S¯i),
∀i ∈ [n], are independent across i, we can safely drop this dependence.
6log(|X |)), then the eavesdropper has no knowledge of the variable X . Differently, larger values
of DKL(p(x|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn)||p(x|si)), i.e., smaller values of H(X|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) indicate lower
levels of privacy. Therefore, we consider H(X|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) as an indication of the level of
privacy attained for the variable X . We focus on designing transmission schemes with guaranteed
levels of privacy regarding three different quantities for each client:
i) Privacy in the request, captured by H(Qi|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn);
ii) Privacy in the side information, captured by H(Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn);
iii) Joint privacy, captured by H(Qi, Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn).
Therefore, our goal is to design a transmission scheme which provides privacy guarantees - in
terms of the aforementioned metrics - for a given number of transmissions.
III. GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY
Based on the knowledge of (Q¯[n], S¯[n]), the server chooses to use an encoding matrix A = Aˆ
such that it satisfies all clients, i.e., it allows each client to decode her request using her side
information set.
Definition III.1. A (q,S) pair is said to be decodable in Aˆ if, using Aˆ as encoding matrix,
message bq can be decoded knowing bS .
Definition III.2. A q (or S) is said to be decodable in Aˆ if there exists S (or q) such that (q,S)
is decodable in Aˆ.
In order to design an encoding matrix that satisfies all clients, we rely on the following lemma
– a slight variation of [11, Lemma 4] – which provides a decodability criterion for (q,S) using
a matrix Aˆ.
Lemma III.1 (Decodability Criterion). Let Aˆ be the encoding matrix used by the server. Then,
the pair (q,S) is decodable in Aˆ iff Aˆq /∈ span(Aˆ[m]\{q∪S}).
Lemma III.1 provides a necessary and sufficient algebraic condition on whether a particular
(q,S) pair is decodable using a given encoding matrix. The eavesdropper, when trying to infer
information about ci, i ∈ [n − 1], can therefore apply this decodability criterion on all possible
(qi,Si) pairs with |Si| = si, to determine the subset of pairs that are decodable using Aˆ. In other
words, since she knows that the request of client ci must be satisfied, then the actual (q¯i, S¯i)
pair of client ci must belong to this set of decodable pairs. Thus, the size of the set of decodable
7pairs with side information sets of size si determines the uncertainty that the eavesdropper has
regarding the information of client ci and hence the attained levels of privacy for ci. Therefore,
in order to maintain high levels of privacy, it is imperative to design encoding matrices with
decodable sets of large sizes.
We next formalize this intuition. Towards this end, we define the following three quantities:
(i) D(Aˆ, si), i.e., the set of decodable (qi,Si) pairs in Aˆ for client ci; (ii) DQ(Aˆ, si), i.e., the
set of decodable qi in Aˆ for client ci, and (iii) DS(Aˆ, si), i.e., the set of decodable Si in Aˆ for
client ci. To better understand this notation, consider the following example.
Example. Consider m = 5, n = 2 and s1 = 1. If the server uses Aˆ1 =
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
 as an
encoding matrix, then D(Aˆ1, 1) = {(1, i), (3, j)} with i ∈ [5]\{1} and j ∈ [5]\{3}, DQ(Aˆ1, 1) =
{1, 3} and DS(Aˆ1, 1) = [5]. Now, suppose that the server uses Aˆ2 =
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
. Then,
D(Aˆ2, 1) = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 4), (4, 3)}, DQ(Aˆ2, 1) = DS(Aˆ2, 1) = [4]. Clearly, |D(Aˆ1, 1)| >
|D(Aˆ2, 1)| and |DS(Aˆ1, 1)| > |DS(Aˆ2, 1)|, but |DQ(Aˆ1, 1)| < |DQ(Aˆ2, 1)|.
With this, we have the following remark that relates the privacy metrics to the sizes of the
decodable sets (see Appendix A for details).
Remark III.2. When the eavesdropper observes the encoding matrix Aˆ, then for all i ∈ [n− 1]
and si ∈ [m− 1], we have
H(Qi, Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) ≤ log |D(Aˆ, si)|, (2a)
H(Qi|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) ≤ log |DQ(Aˆ, si)|, (2b)
H(Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) ≤ log |DS(Aˆ, si)|. (2c)
Moreover, these bounds are tight iff the corresponding probability distributions are uniform.
Namely:
i) eq.(2a) is tight iff p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) is uniform over (qi,Si) ∈ D(Aˆ, si);
ii) eq.(2b) is tight iff p(qi|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) is uniform over qi ∈ DQ(Aˆ, si);
iii) eq.(2c) is tight iff p(Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) is uniform over Si ∈ DS(Aˆ, si).
Remark III.2 implies that the sizes of the decodable sets give an upper bound on the corre-
sponding levels of the privacy metrics. Moreover, one can show that the conditions i) to iii) in
Remark III.2 hold – and hence bounds (2a) to (2c) are tight – if p(Aˆ|q¯[n], S¯[n]) in the transmission
8strategy (described in Section II) is properly designed. For instance, using Bayes’ rule, it can be
shown – see Appendix A for the details – that condition i) is satisfied iff∑
qK,SK∈
∏
j∈K
D(Aˆ,sj)
p(Aˆ|q[n],S[n], s[n]), K = [n− 1]\{i}
is the same for all (qi,Si) ∈ D(Aˆ, si).
From Remark III.2, it follows that the design of privacy-preserving transmission schemes
consists of two main steps: (i) designing encoding matrices with large decodable sets and (ii)
using transmission strategies which satisfy uniformity conditions and hence achieve maximum
levels of privacy.
Based on the result in Remark III.2, we now derive universal upper bounds (i.e., which hold
independently of the encoding matrix that the server uses) on the decodable sets and hence on
the levels of the privacy metrics. In particular, we have
Lemma III.3. For any Aˆ ∈ FT×mL and si ∈ [m− 1], we have
|D(Aˆ, si)| ≤ T
(
m
si
)
=: UBQ,S, (3a)
|DQ(Aˆ, si)| ≤ m =: UBQ, (3b)
|DS(Aˆ, si)| ≤
(
m
si
)
=: UBS. (3c)
Proof: The upper bounds in (3b) and (3c) simply follow by noticing that the size of a decodable
set is upper bounded by the size of the support of the corresponding random variable. We next
prove the bound in (3a). For a given encoding matrix Aˆ ∈ FT×mL , one can write D(Aˆ, si) =∑
Si∈([m]si )
N (Aˆ,Si), where N (Aˆ,Si) is the set of requests qi ∈ DQ(Aˆ, si) for which the pair
(qi,Si) is decodable. According to Lemma III.1, for each qi ∈ N (Aˆ,Si), Aˆqi is not in the span
of Aˆ[m]\Si∪qi . It is therefore straightforward to show that the columns of AˆN (Aˆ,Si) are linearly
independent. Thus, |N (Aˆ,Si)| ≤ T and hence we have |D(Aˆ, si)| ≤ T
(
m
si
)
. 
IV. DESIGN OF A TRANSMISSION SPACE
In this section, we take first steps towards designing a privacy-preserving transmission scheme.
Specifically, we design an encoding matrix, referred to as the base matrix Abase. Then, we
populate the transmission space with the matrices obtained from Abase by taking all the permu-
tations of its columns. Our design of Abase is based on the use of Maximum Distance Separable
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Figure 1. Design of the base matrix Abase for the achievable scheme.
(MDS) codes. A generator matrix of an [m,T ] MDS code has the property that any T × T
submatrix is full rank, i.e., any T columns are linearly independent. Such matrices promise to
provide large decodable sets. To see this notice that, for a given side information set S with
|S| ≥ m − T , all requests in [m] \ S are decodable with S. Therefore, if B ∈ FT×mL is a
generator matrix of an [m,T ] MDS code, then, for all s ≥ m − T , we have |DQ(B, s)| = m
and |D(B, s)| = m(m−1
s
)
= O(ms). However, this scheme might require a prohibitively large
number of transmissions T , especially when m is large and s is small compared to m. To achieve
high levels of privacy with T that is not that large, we next propose the design of Abase, which
is based on a block-MDS as shown in Figure 1 and structured as follows:
i) The columns of Abase are divided in k + 1 segments, labeled as “Seg. 0 to k”, where T is
a multiple of k;
ii) Segments from 1 to k consist of ` columns, where ` ≤ min{smin + T/k, bm/kc}, with
smin = mini∈[n] si;
iii) A matrix Ab ∈ F
T
k
×`
L is constructed as the generator matrix of an [`, T/k] MDS code; then,
Ab is repeated k times and positioned in Abase as shown in Figure 1;
iv) The rest of Abase is filled with zeros.
Note that, for any number of clients n and messages m, one can always find values of k, `
and T so that Abase satisfies all clients (e.g., k = 1, ` = smin and T = n).
We now analyze the performance of our proposed Abase in terms of the sizes of its decodable
sets (see Appendix B). These, by means of Remark III.2, provide upper bounds on the levels of
privacy that could be attained using Abase.
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Figure 2. Numerical evaluation of rQ, rS and rQ,S - m = 30 and s = 3.
Theorem IV.1. For Abase and any si ∈ [m− 1], we have
H(Qi, Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) ≤ log
k` `−1∑
j=`−T/k
(
`− 1
j
)(
m− `
si − j
) , (4a)
H(Qi|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) ≤ (k`) . (4b)
where the bounds can be achieved by satisfying the uniformity conditions in Remark III.2
In the next section we study a special scenario in which we use the transmission space here
proposed (i.e., populated by the matrices obtained from Abase by taking all the permutations of
its columns) and we design the transmission strategy.
V. TRANSMISSION STRATEGY FOR A SPECIAL CASE
In the previous section, we designed a transmission space that consists of all possible matrices
obtained by permuting the columns of the matrix Abase. Thus, as discussed in Section II, in
order to design a transmission scheme, we need to design a transmission strategy that selects
which specific matrix to use according to a probability distribution. However, designing such
a transmission strategy that achieves the upper bounds in Remark III.2 is non-trivial. To get
an analytical handle on the problem, we take a first step and consider a simplified model: we
assume n = 2 and an eavesdropper who does not have a request. Such a scenario can model
a situation where the n = 2 clients (the second of which is the eavesdropper) do not have a
simultaneous request.
Since only one client needs to be satisfied, then we can use our proposed encoding matrix
Abase with k = T and ` ≤ min{s1+1, bm/T c}, knowing that the client c1 can always be satisfied
by using the appropriate column-permutation of Abase (i.e., by ensuring that Abaseq1 is non-zero,
and all other columns belonging to the same segment of Abaseq1 correspond to messages in S1). In
this case, Ab is a row vector of arbitrary non-zero values. The following theorem (whose proof
can be found in Appendix C) then provides analytical guarantees on the attained performance
of this scheme.
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Theorem V.1. For the scheme described above, we have
H(Q1, S1|Aˆ, s1) = log T`
(
m− `
s1 − `+ 1
)
=: LBQ,S, (5a)
H(Q1|Aˆ, s1) = log T` =: LBQ, (5b)
H(S1|Aˆ, s1) = log T`
(
m− `
s1 − `+ 1
)
− K =: LBS, (5c)
K =
T∑
i=1
(
T − 1
i− 1
)
`i−1
(
m−i`
s1−i(`−1)
)(
m−`
s1−`+1
) i∑
x=1
(−1)i−x
(
i−1
x−1
)
log x,
where Aˆ is the column permutation of Abase that is used.
Note that the two quantities in (5a) and (5b) meet the upper bounds that follow from The-
orem IV.1 by applying the conditions in Remark III.2. Moreover, in order to get the bounds
in (5), we used a transmission strategy for which p(Aˆ|q¯1, S¯1) is uniform over all Aˆ that satisfy
(q¯1, S¯1) for all (q¯1, S¯1) ∈ D(Aˆ, s1). This is because, thanks to the special structure of Abase, the
number of column-permutations of Abase that satisfies a given (q¯1, S¯1) is equal for all (q¯1, S¯1).
We next analyze the performance of our scheme. Towards this end, we define the following
quantities:
• GQ,S := log (UBQ,S)− LBQ,S , rQ,S = 2−GQ,S ;
• GQ := log (UBQ)− LBQ, rQ = 2−GQ;
• GS := log (UBS)− LBS , rS = 2−GS .
Figure 2 shows an example of how the quantities rQ,S , rQ and rS behave as ` changes. Note
that all these quantities are fractions and hence the maximum level of privacy (y-axis) is 1.
Figure 2 shows that as ` increases, higher values of privacy are attained in the requests (i.e., rQ
increases), but smaller levels of privacy are achieved in the side information (i.e., rS decreases).
This highlights a trade-off: maintaining a certain level of privacy on one aspect limits the amount
of privacy level achieved on the other. It is also noted that increasing T increases the attained
values of rQ and rS for the same value of `. We believe that the reason such increase does not
occur in rQ,S is because UBQ,S in (3a) is loose.
Next, we assess the performance of our scheme when the parameters of the system grow. We
assume that s1 = c ·m and ` = b ·m+ 1, where b ≤ c ≤ m−1m . We consider two cases:
Case I: c = m−kc
m
where kc > 0 is a constant. In this case, full privacy in the request, side
information and their joint can be achieved by using an [m,T ] MDS code with T = kc.
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Case II: c and T are constants. In this case, by choosing b = 0, we get GQ = log mT = O(logm)
and GQ,S = log
(mcm)
T(m−1cm )
= log 1
T (1−c) = O(1). Also, since conditioning reduces the entropy, we
have H(S1|Aˆ, s1) ≥ eq. (5a) − eq. (5b), which implies GS ≤ log (
m
cm)
(m−1cm )
= log 1
1−c = O(1).
This suggests that when s1 grows as a constant fraction of m, then with a constant number of
transmissions we can have almost perfect side information (and joint) privacy, but very little
privacy in the request. However, if we choose b = c, then we get GQ ≤ log 1Tc = O(1),
GQ,S = GS ≤ log
(
m
cm
)
= O(m logm) since, under these conditions, K = 0 in (5c). Thus, in this
case almost full privacy is achieved in the request while very little privacy is attained in the side
information (and in the joint).
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered an index coding instance where some clients are malicious: they wish to learn
information about the requests and side information of the other clients. We showed how this
privacy breach is possible by learning the encoding matrix used by the server. We proposed
information-theoretic metrics to model the levels of privacy that can be guaranteed and we
designed an encoding matrix for protecting privacy. Then, for a special case of the problem, we
derived in closed-form the levels of privacy that our proposed scheme achieves. We showed an
inherent trade-off between protecting privacy of either the request or the side information set of
the clients.
REFERENCES
[1] Z. Bar-Yossef, Y. Birk, T. Jayram, and T. Kol, “Index coding with side information,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 1479–1494, Mar. 2011.
[2] S. H. Dau, V. Skachek, and Y. M. Chee, “On the security of index coding with side information,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 3975–3988, Jun. 2012.
[3] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan, “Private information retrieval,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 45,
no. 6, pp. 965–981, Nov. 1998.
[4] R. Tajeddine and S. E. Rouayheb, “Private information retrieval from MDS coded data in distributed storage systems,”
arXiv:1602.01458, Feb. 2016.
[5] R. Freij-Hollanti, O. Gnilke, C. Hollanti, and D. Karpuk, “Private information retrieval from coded databases with colluding
servers,” arXiv:1611.02062, Nov. 2016.
[6] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “The capacity of private information retrieval,” arXiv:1602.09134, Feb. 2016.
[7] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “The capacity of private information retrieval from coded databases,” arXiv:1609.08138, Sep.
2016.
13
[8] G. Brassard, C. Crepeau, and J.-M. Robert, “All-or-nothing disclosure of secrets,” Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings
of Crypto ’86, Springer-Verlag, pp. 234–238, 1987.
[9] M. Mishra, B. K. Dey, V. M. Prabhakaran, and S. Diggavi, “The oblivious transfer capacity of the wiretapped binary
erasure channel,” in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Jun. 2014, pp. 1539–1543.
[10] N. Li, T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian, “t-closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity,” in IEEE 23rd
International Conference on Data Engineering, Apr. 2007, pp. 106–115.
[11] L. Song and C. Fragouli, “Content-type coding,” in International Symposium on Network Coding (NetCod), Jun. 2015, pp.
31–35.
APPENDIX A
We prove the result for the upper bound in (2a). Given Aˆ and si, the set D(Aˆ, si) consists
of all possible (qi,Si) pairs that could be the request/side information pair for ci. Therefore,
p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) = 0 for all (qi,Si) /∈ D(Aˆ, si). Therefore,
H(Qi, Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) = −
∑
(qi,Si)∈D(Aˆ,si)
p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) log p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) ≤ log |D(Aˆ, si)|,
thus proving (2a). Since p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) = 0 for all (qi,Si) /∈ D(Aˆ, si), then this upper
bound is achieved if and only if p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) is uniform over for (qi,Si) ∈ D(Aˆ, si),
thus proving the uniformity condition i) on (2a). Similar arguments can be made to prove (2b)
and (2c).
Next, we show that the uniformity conditions in i)-iii) imply constraints on the design of the
transmission strategy p(Aˆ|q[n],S[n]). To see this, note that we can write
p(qi,Si|Aˆ, s[n], qn,Sn) = p(Aˆ|q{i,n},S{i,n}, s[n])
p(qi,Si|s[n], qn,Sn)
p(Aˆ|s[n], qn,Sn)
,
which follows by applying Bayes’ rule. Since the probabilities in the fraction term do not depend
on the value of (qi,Si) (note that p(qi,Si|s[n]) is uniform), then the uniformity condition i) is
satisfied if and only if the term p(Aˆ|q{i,n},S{i,n}, s[n]) is the same for all (qi,Si) ∈ D(Aˆ, si). We
can further write
p(Aˆ|q{i,n},S{i,n}, s[n]) =
∑
qK,SK∈
∏
j∈K
D(Aˆ,sj)
p(Aˆ|q[n],S[n], s[n])p(qK,SK|qi,Si, s[n]), K = [n− 1] \ i.
Note that the distribution p(qK,SK|qi,Si, s[n]) is assumed to be uniform and independent over
i ∈ [n]. Therefore, to satisfy the uniformity condition, we must have the summation term on the
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Righ-Hand Side to be the same for all (qi,Si) ∈ D(Aˆ, si). This therefore imposes constraints on
the transmission strategy used by the server. We can similarly show that the uniformity conditions
on (2b) and (2c) also impose constraints on the used transmission strategy.
APPENDIX B
In order to prove Theorem IV.1, we need to characterize the quantities |D(Aˆ, s)| and |DQ(Aˆ, s)|,
and therefore, using Remark III.2 the result in Theorem IV.1 follows.
Characterizing |DQ(Aˆ, s)|: One can show that every request q whose corresponding column
Abaseq is non-zero has at least one side information set S with which (q,S) is decodable in Abase.
If this in fact is true, then the result |DQ(Abase, s)| = k` follows immediately, since we have
k` such requests. To prove this statement then, notice that ` ≤ smin + T/k. Then consider a
side information set with |S| = smin and where all the elements of S correspond to columns
of the same segment as Abaseq . Therefore, the set of all columns of A
base belonging to the same
segment as Abaseq and do not belong to S is of size ` − S = T/k. They are therefore linearly
independent, and q is decodable with S.
Characterizing |D(Aˆ, s)|: To prove the remaining quantity, notice that we can writeD(Abase, s) =∑
q∈[m]N (Abase, q), where N (Abase, q) is the number of side information sets that are decodable
with q in Abase. For a given q, this quantity is equal to
N (Abase, q) =
`−1∑
i=`−T/k
(
`− 1
i
)(
m− `
s− i
)
, (6)
for all q with Abase being non-zero, and 0 otherwise. Since this quantity does not depend on
the value of q, then the result follows that D(Abase, s) = k`
`−1∑
i=`−T/k
(
`−1
i
)(
m−`
s−i
)
. What remains is
to prove (6), which we justify as follows: Consider a given q with a non-zero corresponding
column in Abase, and let j be the index of the segment to which Abaseq belongs. For a given side
information set S, let i be the number of elements in S whose corresponding columns in Abase
belong to j. Then, (q,S) is decodable in Abase if and only if the elements `− T/k ≤ i ≤ `− 1;
the lower bound is to ensure that the columns of Abase belonging to segment j that fall outside
of S are linearly independent, and the upper bound is to ensure that q is not in S. The number
of subsets S with i columns in segment j is equal to (`−1
i
)(
m−`
s−`+1
)
. Therefore, by summing over
all possible i and multiplying by the number of possible requests we get the expression in (6).
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APPENDIX C
For this scheme, we can have p(Aˆ|q1,S1) = 1/K for all Aˆ ∈ A for all (q1,S1) ∈ D(Aˆ, s1),
where K is equal to
K = T
(
s
`− 1
)(
m− `
` ` · · · `︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
)(M)
,
where the last term is a multinomial coefficient. This is because the number of column-permutations
of Aˆbase that satisfies a given (q1,S1) is equal to K, independently of the value of (q1,S1). This
statement can be justified as follows: for a pair to be decodable, the column of the encoding
matrix corresponding to q should be non-zero, and since we have T segments, then there are
T possibilities for that column; thus the term T in the expression. Next, all remaining ` − 1
columns of the same segment must correspond to elements in the side information set; thus the
term
(
s
`−1
)
. Finally, among the remaining m − ` columns, we have to choose k − 1 segments,
each of length `; thus the final multinomial term.
Calculating H(Q1, S1|Aˆ, s1): Note that by using the transmission strategy described above, we
satisfy the uniformity condition of Remark III.2 for (2a). Therefore, we have H(Q1, S1|Aˆ, s1) =
log |D(Aˆ, s1)| = log T l
(
m−`
s−`+1
)
. The last equality can be obtained by considering (4b) with k = T .
Calculating H(Q1|Aˆ, s1): Using the transmission strategy described above also satisfies the
uniformity condition of Remark III.2 for (2b). To see this, note that
p(q1|Aˆ, s1) =
∑
S1:(q1,S1)∈D(Aˆ,s1)
p(q1,S1|Aˆ, s1),
where the number of elements in the summation corresponds to the number of subsets S1 that are
decodable with q1, which is equal to
(
m−`
s−`+1
)
irrespective of q1. Therefore, p(q1|Aˆ, s1) is uniform
over all q1 ∈ DQ(Aˆ, s1). Thus we have H(Q1|Aˆ, s1) = log |DQ(Aˆ, s1)| = log T`, where the last
equality similarly holds by considering (4b) with k = T .
Calculating H(S1|Aˆ, s1): Using the transmission strategy above does not satisfy the uniformity
condition of Remark III.2 for (2c). Therefore, we now seek to quantify the achieved value of
H(S1|Aˆ, s1).
Note that the used transmission strategy would yield p(q1,S1|Aˆ, s1) = 1/|D(Aˆ, s1)| for all
(q1,S1) ∈ D(Aˆ, s1) and 0 otherwise. One can then write the marginal p(S1|Aˆ, s1) as
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p(S1|Aˆ, s) =
∑
q1∈DQ(Aˆ,s1)
p(q1,S1|Aˆ, s1) =
NAˆ,S1
|D(Aˆ, s1)|
,
where NAˆ,S1 is the number of requests q1 that are decodable with S1 in Aˆ. Therefore, we have
H(S1|Aˆ, s1) = −
∑
S1∈DS(Aˆ,s1)
NAˆ,S1
|D(Aˆ, s1)|
log
NAˆ,S1
|D(Aˆ, s1)|
= log |D(Aˆ, s1)| − 1|D(Aˆ, s1)|
∑
S1∈DS(Aˆ,s1)
NAˆ,S1 logNAˆ,S1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N¯t
. (7)
Next we calculate N¯t. For a given S1, let `j, j ∈ [T ] be the number of elements of S1 for
which the corresponding columns in Aˆ belong to segment j. Then in order for a pair (q1,S1)
to be decodable, then `j must be exactly equal to `− 1, where j corresponds to the segment to
which Aˆq belongs.
Note that NAˆ,S1 only depends on the values of `j , and therefore all subsets S1 for which
`j, j ∈ [T ] are the same will have the same value for NAˆ,S1 . Based on this fact, we can then
write
N¯t =
∑`
`1=0
· · ·
∑`
`T=0
(
`
`1
)
· · ·
(
`
`T
)( m− T`
s1 −
T∑
i=1
`i
)( T∑
i=1
1{`i=`−1}
)
log
(
T∑
i=1
1{`i=`−1}
)
(a)
=
T∑
x=1
x log x
(
T
x
)
`x
Cs1,T (T−x)︷ ︸︸ ︷ ∑`
`1=0
`1 6=`−1
· · ·
∑`
`T−x=0
`T−x 6=`−1
(
`
`1
)
· · ·
(
`
`T−x
)( m− T`
s1 − x(`− 1)−
T−x∑
i=1
`i
) (8)
where (a) can be justified as follows: note that the possible values to which the term
T∑
i=1
1{`i=`−1}
evaluates are x ∈ [T ] (x = 0 is also possible, but trivial). Moreover, it is equal to x if and only
if there are exactly x indices from the set `[T ] which are equal to ` − 1, while the remaining
indices can take any value (except `− 1). Therefore, by means of counting arguments, N¯t can
be expressed as (8).
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Note that we can write
Cs1,T (T − x) =
 ∑`
`1=0
`1 6=`−1
· · ·
l∑
`T−x=0
`T−x 6=`−1
(
`
`1
)
· · ·
(
`
`T−x
)( m− T`
s1 − x(`− 1)−
T−x∑
i=1
`i
)
(b)
=
Bs1,T (T−x)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑`
`1=0
· · ·
∑`
`T−x=0
(
l
`1
)
· · ·
(
`
`T−x
)( m− T`
s1 − x(`− 1)−
T−x∑
i=1
`i
)−
T−x∑
y=1
(
T − x
y
)
`y
 ∑`
`1=0
`1 6=`−1
..
∑`
`T−x−y=0
`T−x−y 6=`−1
(
`
`1
)
..
(
`
`T−x−y
)( m− T`
s1 − (x+ y)(`− 1)−
T−x−y∑
i=1
`i
)
= Bs1,T (T − x)−
T−x∑
y=1
(
T − x
y
)
`yCs1,T (T − x− y) (9)
where (b) follows by adding the missing summation terms of Cs1,T (T − x) corresponding to
`i = `−1 and - by means of counting - subtracting them. By noting that Cs1,T (0) =
(
m−T`
s1−T (`−1)
)
,
equation (9) then defines a linear recurrence relation on Cs1,T (T − x) which we solve in the
following lemma.
Lemma C.1. The solution to the linear recurrence relation in (9) is
Cs1,T (T − x) =
T−x∑
v=0
(−1)v`v
(
T − x
v
)
Bs1,T (T − x− v) (10)
where Bs1,T (0) =
(
m−T`
s1−T (`−1)
)
.
Proof: We will solve the recurrence relation using strong induction. Specifically, assume that
Cs1,T (T − x− y) =
T−x−y∑
v=0
(−1)v`v
(
T − x− y
v
)
Bs1,T (T − x− v − y)
for 1 ≤ y ≤ T − x. Then consider
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T−x∑
y=1
(
T − x
y
)
`yCs1,T (T − x− y) =
=
T−x∑
y=1
T−x−y∑
v=0
(−1)v`v+y
(
T − x
y
)(
T − x− y
v
)
Bs1,T (T − x− v − y)
(c)
=
T−x∑
k=1
(−1)k`k
(
T − x
k
)
Bs1,T (T − x− k)
k−1∑
v=0
(−1)v−k
(
T−x
k−v
)(
T−x−k+v
v
)(
T−x
k
)
=
T−x∑
k=1
(−1)k`k
(
T − x
k
)
Bs1,T (T − x− k)
k−1∑
v=0
(−1)k−v
(
k
k − v
)
=
T−x∑
k=1
(−1)k`k
(
T − x
k
)
Bs1,T (T − x− k)
k∑
v′=1
(−1)v′
(
k
v′
)
=
T−x∑
k=1
(−1)k`k
(
T − x
k
)
Bs1,T (T − x− k)(δk0 − 1)
= −
T−x∑
k=0
(−1)k`k
(
T − x
k
)
Bs1,T (T − x− k) +Bs1,T (T − x)
where (c) follows by i) changing summation variables as v + y = k and ii) multiplying and
dividing by (−1)k(T−x
k
)
, and where δij is the Kronecher delta function. Therefore we have
Cs1,T (T − x) =
T−x∑
k=0
(−1)k`k
(
T − x
k
)
Bs1,T (T − x− k)
= Bs1,T (T − x)−
T−x∑
y=1
(
T − x
y
)
`yCs1,T (T − x− y)
satisfying (9), thus completing the proof. 
By plugging (10) in (8), we can further simply (8) as follows
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N¯t =
T∑
x=1
x log x
(
T
x
)
`x
T−x∑
v=0
(−1)v`v
(
T − x
v
)
Bs1,T (T − x− v)
=
T∑
x=1
T−x∑
v=0
x log x
(
T
x
)(
T − x
v
)
`x+v(−1)vBs1,T (T − x− v)
=
T∑
x=1
T−x∑
v=0
x log x
(
T
x+ v
)(
x+ v
x
)
`x+v(−1)vBs1,T (T − x− v)
=
T∑
i=1
i∑
x=1
x log x
(
T
i
)(
i
x
)
`i(−1)i−xBs1,T (T − i)
=
T∑
i=1
(
T
i
)
`iBs1,T (T − i)
i∑
x=1
(−1)i−x
(
i
x
)
x log x
=
T∑
i=1
(
T
i
)
`iBs1,T (T − i)
i∑
x=1
(−1)i−xi
(
i− 1
x− 1
)
log x
= T
T∑
i=1
(
T − 1
i− 1
)
`iBs1,T (T − i)
i∑
x=1
(−1)i−x
(
i− 1
x− 1
)
log x. (11)
Also, we can write
Bs1,T (T − x) =
∑`
`1=0
· · ·
∑`
`T−x=0
m−T`∑
y=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−x∑
i=1
li+y=s1−x(`−1)
(
`
`1
)
· · ·
(
`
`T−x
)(
m− T`
y
)
(d)
=
(
m− x`
s1 − x(`− 1)
)
(12)
where (d) follows by using Vandermonde’s identity. Using (7), (11) and (12) thus proves the
theorem.
